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Abstract 
 
Purpose of this paper The purpose of this paper is to engage in a comprehensive review 
of the research on strategic alliances in the last decade. 
Design/methodology/approach After presenting a typology of diverse alliance governance forms, 
we review recent analyses of alliance formation, implementation 
management, and performance outcomes of collaborative activities. 
Findings Strategic alliances developed and propagated as formalized 
interorganizational relationships.  These cooperative arrangements 
represent new organizational formation that seeks to achieve 
organizational objectives better through collaboration than through 
competition. 
Practical implications  
(if applicable) 
The paper provides future research directions on partner selection, 
networks patterns and processes, understanding the integration in 
alliances through fusion, fission, and how to manage developmental 
dynamics. 
What is original/value of paper We conclude with some future directions for theory construction and 
empirical research. 
  
  
Introduction 
 
The international business literature has already acknowledged a number of positive outcomes 
for companies actively engaged in strategic alliances, such as higher return on equity, better 
return on investment, and higher success rates, compared with integration through mergers and 
acquisitions, or companies in the Fortune 500 list that avoid building inter-corporate 
relationships (Booz-Allen & Hamilton, 1999). At the same time, it is an acknowledge fact that 
there is little understanding among business executives regarding the formation processes, the 
dynamics and evolution of inter-corporate relations, and what are the factors that determine the 
success rate in strategic alliances (O’Farrell & Wood, 1999). Much of the fundamentals in this 
field were established with the seminal edited volume by Contractor and Lorange (1988) on Co-
operative Strategies in International Business, with contributions from Buckley and Casson on a 
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‘theory of co-operation’, Contractor and Lorange on ‘the strategy and economic basis for 
cooperative ventures’, Harrigan on ‘partner asymmetries’ - among other positional papers in the 
same volume.  The research in the field was marked also by contributions from Cunningham & 
Calligan (1991) on ‘competitiveness through networks of relationships’, Hamel (1991) on ‘inter-
partner learning in strategic alliances’, Auster (1994) on ‘theoretical perspectives on inter-
organisational linkages’, Gulati (1995) on the relationsgip between repeated transactions and 
trust’, Doz (1996) on the ‘learning processes in strategic alliances’,  Little, et.al. (1998) on 
‘management of collaborations in technology based product markets’. 
 
The issues of trust, partner selection, knowledge transfer through co-operative business 
ventures, complementarities and synergies between partners have dominated the scientific 
discourse. Some of the leading research questions explored were: why alliances are set-up 
(Gugler, 1992, Lei, 1993); the international context of cross—border strategic alliances 
(Snodgrass, 1993, Levinson & Asahi (1995), or how to achieve success in international strategic 
alliances (Bleeke and Ernst (eds.) 1993), Mohr and Spekman, 1994). In general the 
contributions to the field of inter-corporate strategic alliances focus either on an in-depth 
analysis of a selected narrow issue - such as the effect of knowledge ambiguity on technological 
knowledge transfer in strategic alliances (Simonin, 1999), and methodological issues of 
construct validity in measuring strategic alliance performance (Arino, 2003), or swiping 
generalizations of more general magnitude – such as Bensimon’s executive guidelines (1. 
assimilate the competencies of your partner; 2. think of your partner as today’s ally and 
tomorrow’s competitor; 3. Share power and resources, but share information wisely; 4. structure 
your alliance carefully) (Bensimon, 1999). 
 
In this paper, we seek to go beyond the current trends in the business and management 
literature on strategic alliances, and to explain the formation, implementation, and 
consequences of strategic alliances among autonomous actors in an organizational field.  We 
review the recent theoretical and empirical research literatures on strategic alliances and the 
globalization of competition and cooperation. We examine the purposes and motives of 
organizations entering into strategic alliances, and driving forces behind this process.   
 
Next, we analyze the implementation processes and problems encountered in managing 
alliances, particularly building partner trust and safeguarding against opportunism. We look at 
the consequences of strategic alliances, including: the transformation of various kinds of 
organizational capital (human, financial, cultural, social); outcomes for both an alliance and its 
partner organizations; their impacts on the division of labor within organizational fields; and 
consequences at the societal level.  Finally, we conclude with some speculations about future 
directions for theory construction and research on strategic alliances.     
 
The Concepts of Strategic Alliances and Organisational Fields 
 
Several interorganizational formations emerge when organizations search for new efficiencies 
and competitive advantages while avoiding both market uncertainties and hierarchical rigidities.  
The classification in Table 1 presents thirteen basic forms of interorganizational relations 
appearing in the theoretical and research literatures. The principal dimension ordering this 
classification is that, from bottom to top, collaborating firms experience increasing integration 
and formalization in the governance of their interorganizational relationships.  Governance 
refers to combinations of legal and social control mechanisms for coordinating and safeguarding 
the alliance partners’ resource contributions, administrative responsibilities, and division of 
rewards from their joint activities. At the bottom of Table 1 are pure market transactions 
requiring no obligation for recurrent cooperation, coordination, or collaboration among the 
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anonymous exchanging parties.  At the top are hierarchical authority relations in which one firm 
takes full control, absorbing another’s assets and personnel into a unitary enterprise.  In 
between these extremes of market and hierarchy are eleven general strategic alliance forms, or 
“hybrids” that combine varying degrees of market interaction and bureaucratic integration 
(Williamson 1975).   
 
A strategic alliance involves at least two partner firms that: (1) remain legally independent after 
the alliance is formed; (2) share benefits and managerial control over the performance of 
assigned tasks; and (3) make continuing contributions in one or more strategic areas, such as 
technology or products (Yoshino and Rangan 1995:5).  These three criteria imply that strategic 
alliances create interdependence between autonomous economic units, bringing new benefits 
to the partners in the form of intangible assets, and obligating them to make continuing 
contributions to their partnership.  Different alliance forms represent different approaches that 
partner firms adopt to control their dependence on the alliance and on other partners.  The 
strategic alliance forms in Table 1 are also associated with different legal forms, which enable 
firms to control the resources allocation and the distribution of benefits among the partners.  
(See also Knoke 2001: 121-128)  
 
Table 1. Varieties of Inter-organizational Relations 
 
HIERARCHICAL 
RELATIONS 
Through acquisition or merger, one firm takes full control of another’s 
assets and coordinates actions by the ownership rights mechanism 
JOINT VENTURES Two or more firms create a jointly owned legal organization that serves a 
limited purpose for its parents, such as R&D or marketing 
EQUITY 
INVESTMENTS 
A majority or minority equity holding by one firm through a direct stock 
purchase of shares in another firm 
COOPERATIVES A coalition of small enterprises that combine, coordinate, and manage 
their collective resources 
R&D CONSORTIA 
 
Inter-firm agreements for research and development collaboration, 
typically formed in fast-changing technological fields  
STRATEGIC 
COOPERATIVE 
AGREEMENTS 
Contractual business networks based on joint multi-party strategic control, 
with the partners collaborating over key strategic decisions and sharing 
responsibilities for performance outcomes 
CARTELS Large corporations collude to constrain competition by cooperatively 
controlling production and/or prices within a specific industry 
FRANCHISING A franchiser grants a franchisee the use of a brand-name identity within a 
geographic area, but retains control over pricing, marketing, and 
standardized service norms  
LICENSING 
 
One company grants another the right to use patented technologies or 
production processes in return for royalties and fees 
SUBCONTRACTOR 
NETWORKS 
Inter-linked firms where a subcontractor negotiates its suppliers’ long-term 
prices, production runs, and delivery schedules 
INDUSTRY 
STANDARDS 
GROUPS 
Committees that seek the member organizations’ agreements on the 
adoption of technical standards for manufacturing and trade 
ACTION SETS 
 
Short-lived organizational coalitions whose members coordinate their 
lobbying efforts to influence public policy making 
MARKET 
RELATIONS 
Arm’s-length transactions between organizations coordinated only through 
the price mechanism 
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An organizational field consists of “those organizations that, in the aggregate, constitute a 
recognized area of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory 
agencies, and other organizations that produce similar services or products” (DiMaggio and 
Powell 1983:148).  At any time, a particular organizational field may contain numerous alliance 
networks that compete against rival alliances and traditional single firms.  The overarching 
structure of the field’s alliance networks varies according to the degree of overlap or separation 
among each strategic alliance’s partner firms.     
 
To the extent that trust substitutes for more formal control mechanisms, such as written 
contracts, an alliance can reduce or avoid paying several types of transaction costs, such as 
searching for information about potential partners and monitoring to ensure that each party 
meets its obligations (Gulati 1995a:88-91).     
 
An alternative psychological conceptualization emphasizes trust as confidence in another’s 
goodwill, of faith in the partner’s moral integrity (Ring and Van de Ven 1994).  The social 
psychological explanation of trust is rooted in basic social exchange principles, including 
conformity to such norms as reciprocity, commitment, forbearance, cooperation, and obligations 
to repay debts.   
 
The formation of network relationships is intimately related to the creation of social capital.  
However, networks and social capital are closely related, but not identical, concepts.  If a 
relation proves not to be beneficial for attaining an actor’s goals and turn instead into constraints 
that impede performance, then it constitutes a social liability (Leenders and Gabbay 1999:3).  
Corporate social capital also originates in macro-level processes that are more than aggregated 
interpersonal ties.  Interorganizational networks can generate corporate social capital in the 
form of organizational prestige, reputation, status, and brand name recognition.   
 
The analysis of macro-level processes in the business literature emphasizes the concept of 
intangible assets that firms accumulate by using their human resources and labor.  Webster 
(1999) conceptualized three types of investment in intangible assets: knowledge capital 
(intangible assets which improve the human understanding of the market and the profit 
opportunities); capacity capital (intangible assets which raise the maximum level of production 
through employment of new organization and labor technologies); and control capital (intangible 
assets that enable firms to control their input markets, the quality and quantity of work efforts, 
and the output markets).  The latter can also be divided into rent-seeking capital (dictating 
prices to suppliers), organization capital (controlling the work flow), and market access capital 
(controlling output prices and the level of demand) (Webster 1999:14).  Analysts consider firms’ 
intangible investments as enabling them to reduce competition in order to increase the profits 
from their activities and the potential for appropriation of financial capital through market and 
nonmarket transactions.  The fundamental bases of intangible capital include the individual and 
collective skills, capabilities, and understandings used by a firm to influence and control its 
relations with other firms, business partners, consumers, and governmental regulators.   
 
The Formation of Strategic Alliances 
 
While many analysts regard strategic alliances as recent phenomena, interorganizational 
linkages have existed since the origins of the firm as a production unit.  Some examples include 
firm and entrepreneur ties to credit institutions such as banks; to trade associations such as the 
early Dutch Guilds; and to suppliers of raw materials, such as family farms, individual producers, 
and craftsmen.  Contemporary firms’ networks typically include diverse organizations, such as 
suppliers, buyers, competitors, regulatory authorities, financial and credit institutions, that 
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together comprise the “economic organization of production” (Ghoshal and Bartlett 1990).  
Lorange and Roos (1993) likewise referred to multinational corporations (MNCs) as “networks of 
alliances” that cross national borders and industrial sectors.  Dicken (1994) described these 
production networks as a mix of intra- and interfirm structures of relationships, shaped by 
different degrees and forms of power and influence over inputs, throughputs, and outputs.  
  
Strategic alliances are not only trading partnerships that enhance the effectiveness of the 
participating firms’ competitive strategies by providing for mutual resource exchanges 
(technologies, skills, or products).  They are also new business forms that enable the partners to 
enhance and control their business relationships in various ways.   
 
Strategic Alliances as Hybrid Forms.  Analysts widely recognize that alliances are hybrid 
organizational forms or hybrid arrangements between firms that blend hierarchical and market 
elements (Auster 1994; Olk 1999).  They encompass both short-term project-based, and long-
term equity-based, cooperation between firms with varying degrees of vertical integration and 
interdependence.  Whenever legal or economic constraints prevent a firm from using hierarchy 
or full ownership as a solution, it may opt to enter into an alliance to counteract certain market 
forces that threaten its well-being (Anderson and Gatignon 1986; Hennart 1991).  To a some 
extent, alliances combine the assets and capabilities with the uncertainties and liabilities of all 
partners.   
 
An asymmetry exists in organizational abilities to exert power and control over another 
organization and its resources (Oliver 1990).  Effective cooperation requires mutual recognition 
of these differences and a serious commitment by the partners not to take advantage of one 
another when opportunities arise.  Institutionalizing cooperative agreements is very problematic 
because it requires new structures, routines, and organizational practices to emerge from 
routine interactions and transactions between partners.  Strategic alliances as an organizational 
form stand intermediate to individual firms and more complex social formations such as 
organizational fields and communities of economic actors.   
 
Strategic Motives, Intents, and Choices.  Firms undertake strategic alliances for many 
reasons: to enhance their productive capacities, to reduce uncertainties in their internal 
structures and external environments, to acquire competitive advantages that enables them to 
increase profits, or to gain future business opportunities that will allow them to command higher 
market values for their outputs (Webster 1999).  Partners choose a specific alliance form not 
only to achieve greater control, but also for more operational flexibility and realization of market 
potential.  Their expectation is that flexibility will result from reaching out for new skills, 
knowledge, and markets through shared investment risks.  The strategic motives for 
organizations to engage in alliance formation vary according to firm-specific characteristics and 
the multiple environmental factors.  As summarized in Table 2, this diversity has triggered the 
development of several classification schemes in the theoretical literature.     
 
Bleeke and Ernst (1993) summarize the generic needs of firms seeking alliance as cash, scale, 
skills, access, or their combinations.  Such motivational diversity characterizes alliance 
formation in many industries, and theorists have proposed several explanatory schemes to 
classify and analyze the range of collaborative solutions adopted by firms.  The level of 
cooperation between businesses seems much less influenced by internalized costs and benefits 
than by: the history of the partnering firms’ relationships; the current market positions of each 
firm; their joint resource capabilities; and informational asymmetries relative to firms engaging in 
arm’s-length market transactions (Dietrich 1994).  In other words, forming business networks 
and contractual or relational alliances is driven less by firms’ retrospective economic rationalities 
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than by their strategic intentions.  Two or more autonomous organizations decide to form an 
alliance for an emerging joint purpose.  Therefore, their decision to collaborate cannot be 
determined in a rational way by the purpose itself, nor by the current environmental pressures 
that compel them to cooperate.  On the contrary, these factors merely help firms to construct 
post-facto justifications and rationalizations about their collaboration decision.  A decision to 
cooperate is not a responsive action, but is fundamentally a strategic intent, which aims at 
improving the future circumstances for each individual firm and their partnership as a whole.   
 
 
Table 2. Motives to Enter a Strategic Alliance 
Market seeking 
Acquiring means of distribution 
Gaining access to new technology, and converging technology 
Learning & internalization of tacit, collective and embedded skills 
Obtaining economies of scale 
Achieving vertical integration, recreating and extending supply links in order to adjust to 
environmental changes 
Diversifying into new businesses 
Restructuring, improving performance 
Cost sharing, pooling of resources 
Developing products, technologies, resources 
Risk reduction & risk diversification 
Developing technical standards 
Achieving competitive advantage 
Cooperation of potential rivals, or pre-emptying competitors 
Complementarity of goods and services to markets 
Co-specialization 
Overcoming legal / regulatory barriers 
Legitimation, bandwagon effect, following industry trends  
 
Note: Elaborated from Agarwal and Ramaswami 1992; Auster 1994; Doz and Hamel 1999; Doz, Olk and Ring 2000; 
Harrigan 1988a; Hennart 1991; Lorange and Roos 1993; Zajac 1990 
 
Ultimately, the variety of motives and drivers is enacted at four distinctive levels: organizational 
economic, strategic and political. While seeking partnerships firms try to address internal 
organizational problems, they consider economic benefits, engage in strategic positioning, or 
political maneuvering with governments and competitors. The motives to engage in strategic 
alliances listed in Table 2. therefore can be grouped in 4 different categories: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
1. O rganisational - Learn ing  / C om petence B u ild ing - various k inds 
of learn ing  and  in ternalisation  of tac it, co llective  and em bedd ed skills ; 
restructuring; im pro ving  perform ance; acqu iring  m eans of d is tribu tion;
recreating  an d extend ing  supp ly links in  order to  ad just to  en vironm ental 
changes ; co m plem en tarity o f g oods and  services to  m arkets ; leg itim ation
2. E conom ic – M arket- C ost- &  R isk re lated - m arket seeking; cost 
sharing  and  poo ling  o f resources; risk  red uction  and  risk d iversifica tio n; 
obta in ing econom ies  o f sca le ; co-spec ia lisation
3. Strateg ic - C om petition  S hap ing  / p re-em ption  / P roduct &  
Technology re lated: ach ieving vertica l in tegration ; ach ieving com petitive  
advantage; d iversifying  in to  new  business; ga in ing  access to  new techno log y; 
converg ing  technolo g y; R & D ; deve lop ing  new  prod ucts  and  technolog ies; co -
operation  w ith  potentia l riva ls  or pre -em ptyin g  com petito rs ; b andw agon effect 
and fo llow ing  industry trends
4. Politica l - M arket developm ent: deve loping  techn ical standards;
overcom ing  leg al / regu la tory barriers
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A fundamental contrast between strategic and operational decisions is that the latter are based 
on transaction cost calculations, while strategic choices are determined by the perceived 
benefits from future activities.  A firm’s strategic decisions are driven not only by evaluations of 
its present circumstances, but also by expectations about its future outcomes.  Strategic 
decisions involve both company policies and the resource investments necessary for their 
implementation, treating the perceived future benefits as expected returns on those 
investments.  Strategic alliances challenge the neoclassical economic assumption of interfirm 
competition, because they are driven not by expected direct impact on costs, profits, and other 
tangible benefits, but by indirect positive outcomes from their accumulated intangible assets and 
corporate social capital.  They lock competitors in cooperative ventures where the partners 
share both the risks and the benefits resulting from their collective activity.  The transaction cost 
concept no longer provides a sufficient explanation of organizational behavior because the firms 
pay relational costs arising from all their joint efforts to build bridges to span the partnership’s 
uncertainties.  Relational costs in an alliance are not merely expenditures necessary to maintain 
informal relations with business partners, but additionally include the commitments and 
investments the partners commit to their risky and uncertain venture.  Relational costs to each 
firm arise from potential negative impacts on a company’s profits, occurring because the 
partners must strategically adjust their other business relations and operations to accommodate 
the new alliance.  Participation in an alliance may require a firm to reorganize, reduce, or 
terminate other business relations in order to oblige a new partner’s interests.  This post-
decision adjustment leads to foreclosures of some future business opportunities and their 
associated loss of potential benefits and profits.   
 
Deciding to enter a strategic alliance and selecting a specific governance form also conveys 
organizational power implications.  These choices are shaped by the distribution of economic 
power along the production chain within and outside the partnering firms.  Pressures to form 
alliance derive from processes inside and outside organizations.  Researchers have found that 
alliance forms vary with the firms’ market positions (leader vs. follower) and the strategic 
importance of collaborations within each parent firms’ portfolios (core vs. peripheral business) 
(Lorange and Roos 1993).  Firms tend zealously to protect their core businesses and, are thus 
more willing to enter alliances involving peripheral activities which offer wider scope for 
organizational learning and less vulnerability from sharing confidential information.  Lorange and 
Roos also offered examples of how large firms use joint ownership to restructure their poorly 
performing business segments.  In such instances, the partnership generates instrumental value 
by allowing the dominant firm to undertake radical changes its portfolio’s peripheral activities.   
 
Business Environment Factors.  Alliance formation is broadly shaped by general economic 
conditions and the institutional frameworks in countries of operation, including legal 
requirements, macro-economic policies, price controls, financial capital markets, distribution 
channels, and methods of contract enforcement.  State regulatory activity affects firms’ freedom 
to form business coalitions and joint ventures.  Thus, government intervention provides the 
major constraints and opportunities for strategic alliance formation.  Alliances often require 
formal approval by national governments, particularly in adhering to antimonopoly or antitrust 
regulations.  Likewise, some research and development (R&D) alliances originate as 
government-funded projects that may include heavy state supervision. Tax incentives and 
international trade regimes established by foreign governments can also directly affect domestic 
firms’ decisions whether to enter into long-term overseas business relationships.   
 
Empirical researchers have conducted little comparative research explaining the impact of state 
interventions on alliance formation.  Most investigations of state privatization and economic 
liberalization policies emphasized only the creation of general economic investment 
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opportunities, without ascertaining whether individual firms or strategic alliances were more 
likely to seize such opportunities.  Unfortunately, regulation theorists remain steadily focused on 
macro-level dynamics, while corporate governance researchers explore the strategic 
management practices of individual corporations.  Thus, the meso-level is ripe for analytic 
development.  Another neglected researched area is private-sector partnerships with 
government agencies.  Strategic collaborations with governments are in the business-press 
hype, particularly regarding large global infrastructure projects such as energy, water supply, or 
telecom systems.  Particularly in less-developed countries, or in the defense sector in all 
countries, government procurement, general funding, and other state initiatives are a major 
factor in the proliferation of MNC alliances with local firms.  
 
Another country-specific systemic feature shaping coordinated action patterns is the complex 
set of relations among corporations, business associations, local and central governments, and 
elite universities.  Italian industrial districts are just one renown instance where historically 
rooted local business communities display dense interfirm relationships, based on simultaneous 
competition and cooperation, where alliance ties occur both within and extend well beyond the 
district boundaries.  To explain this phenomenon, Mizruchi and Schwartz (1987) mentioned the 
development theory relationship between the structure of national business communities and 
economic development.  Their core proposition is that businesses take distinct institutional 
forms at different stages of economic development.  Although cooperative ventures occur at all 
developmental stages, business strategic alliances were a globalization phenomenon that 
emerged only after the Second World War.   
 
Theorists generally recognize that firm responses to state regulatory interventions vary widely 
across national cultures.  Two salient examples are the Korean chaebol and the Japanese 
keiretsu, distinctive alliances forms that evolved from such traditional societal institutions as the 
extended family and the industrial cluster (Amin 1992; Gerlach 1992).  Another consensus is 
that both multinational corporations and international strategic alliance networks usually seek to 
overcome, circumvent, or subvert the regulatory mechanisms established by national 
governments (Dicken 1994).     
 
Industrial Factors.  The industrial context of alliances also exerts strong direct impacts on 
interfirm relationships. The intensity of industry competition and the social organization of 
specific product markets powerfully influences whether firm decide to internalize certain 
activities, to compete for greater market share, to cooperate with other firms for particular 
strategic advantages, or to internationalize by entering foreign markets.  The importance of 
industrial contexts lies in how leading supply chains spread across different subsectors and 
which economic transactions occur among connected firms.  Extreme contrasts are industries 
with long-established oligopolies or duopolies and industries with low barriers to entry and high 
rates of new firm creation.   
 
Industries may be classified along numerous dimensions, such as resource consumption levels, 
capital investment, labor scarcity, knowledge intensity, and technological innovation.  This 
multidimensionality means that potentially many industry factors drive organizational strategies 
in seeking alliances for comparative advantage.   
 
Analysts generally recognize that, due to technical or economic rationales, firms are more 
vulnerable when closely tied up to a dominant partner (e.g., Pennings 1994).  Technology plays 
a significant role in setting organizational field boundaries and shaping internal structures.  
Among the competing technologies in a specific industry, some are core and leading while 
others are supporting.  Rapid technological changes, or the abrupt emergence of a 
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competence-destroying technology, can radically restructure an entire organizational field’s 
competitive and collaborative alignments.  The private and governmental sources of technology 
research funding, and R&D expenditure levels in general, differ markedly across industries.  
Cross-border technology alliances benefit directly from these differences.  In most national 
economies, indirect subsidization takes place as governments fund R&D.   
 
Organizational Factors.  The diversity of organizations in an organizational field stems from 
such company-specific properties as their sizes, visible and tacit assets, collaborative histories, 
ownership forms, corporate social capital networks, product ranges and diversification, market 
shares, and market penetration through distribution channels.  Given such diversity, 
propensities to participate in strategic alliances should vary across firms operating within the 
same organizational field.  Corporate social capital influences alliance creation, as new ties 
build on existing interfirm relations (Walker, Kogut and Shan 1997; Gulati 1998:300).   
    
Alliance formation processes are also shaped by a dominant corporation (national or 
multinational).  Dicken (1994) suggested that MNCs, with their complex headquarter-subsidiary 
relationships, have established new foundations for business networks and multifirm alliances.  
Therefore, the subunit coordination taking place inside an MNC provides a convenient blueprint 
for coordinating complex alliance networks.  This dynamic is one reason why alliance analysts 
can never resolve the debate over control and resource allocation processes.  Foreign investors 
facilitate local companies’ integration into global production and distribution chains, creating 
business opportunities for local firms.  In addition, MNCs help to develop domestic markets, 
generate demand and competition, thereby restructuring existing relations within the markets 
they penetrate.  However, studies of equity joint ventures make clear that huge discrepancies 
occur between the objectives of foreign and domestic firms.  Domestic firms typically seek 
opportunities to improve their export capabilities, while foreign firms desire greater access to the 
host country’s markets (Buckley and Casson 1988; Pan and Li 1998).  This tension over 
incompatible objectives, capabilities, and constraints among international joint venture partners 
is a crucial reason why partnering firms often seek equity controls to safeguard their alliance 
risks.   
 
A substantial difference between an MNC and a strategic alliance lies in the concept of shared 
control.  Metaphorically, CEOs describe the alliance management problem by referring to the 
old logic of the octopus and the new logic of the network, where a different kind of 
interdependence emerges (Lorange and Roos 1993).  The octopus symbolizes classical 
management control from the center, while the network metaphor requires decentralized 
organizational structures and management processes to facilitate shared control.  Strategic 
interdependence is one salient feature of successful alliances in dynamic markets (Sanchez 
1994).   
 
Globalization Drivers and Commodity Chains.  Market globalization transforms the nature of 
corporate operations.  Competitive and strategic advantages now derive from companies’ 
capacities to cooperate with other firms; to form business networks with suppliers and buyers; to 
reap economies of scale; and to share costs and benefits with partners in geographically and 
culturally distant locations.  Globalization forces are among the key drivers forcing corporations 
to explore alternative ways of gaining and preserving competitive advantages.  These factors 
include: heightened competitive pressures on a global scale; shorter product life-cycles and 
rapid technological change; emergence of new competitors; personnel recruitment and 
placement practices that extend corporate social capital across national boundaries; and 
increased demand by global firms for systemic solutions.  Long-term strategies based on win-
win scenarios enable them to leverage their outputs for a broader commercial application across 
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different locations and market segments (Lorange and Roos 1993).  According to Zajac’s survey 
of MNC leaders, strategic alliances were considered a viable alternative to mergers and 
internalization strategies by the majority of respondents (Zajac 1990).   
 
Traditional global commodity chains are producer-driven and comprised of four segments: raw 
material supply network, production network, export network, and marketing network (Gereffi 
1990).  Each segment and the entire commodity chain consists of interlinked firms, representing 
an input-output structure with spatial dispersion and concentration of units, and a governance 
structure to coordinate the entire production system (Gereffi 1994).  This governance form has 
more linear ties and is based on repetitive transactions and long-term contracts where the 
producers become push-factors moving their products towards the final retail market.  In 
contrast, the buyer-driven chain has multiple backward and forward linkages and resembles a 
strategic alliance structure with complex logistics pulled by the retail sector with buyer-driven 
orders.  The selection of firms for such chains is very much determined by whether the 
coordinator role is dominated by producers or buyers, and varies across industry contexts.  
Thus, the globalization of commodity chains has stimulated complex economies of scale and 
scope that foster increasing rates of strategic alliance formation.   
 
The Implementation of Strategic Alliances 
 
Alliance implementation issues include the choice of governance mechanisms, enhancing trust 
and reciprocity between partners, managing the integration of project staffs from different 
organizational cultures, and resolving conflicts that arise among partners with divergent 
expectations about and contributions to their collaboration.   
 
Relational Contracting.  Some firms engaging in repeated long-term transactions may attempt 
to use hierarchical governance forms to safeguard the specific assets that evolve during their 
exchanges (Haugland 1999).  Hierarchical governance mechanisms include empowering one 
firm’s decisions over another’s; creating a neutral body with authority and power to control 
specific issues; and implementing standard operating procedures within the alliance.  As an 
alternative to hierarchical governance, Haugland (1999) proposed that relational contracting 
could counteract the uncertainties associated with arm’s-length contracts.  Relational 
governance forms rely on such diverse coordination mechanisms as reciprocity norms, 
interorganizational trust, and social capital embedded in multiplex exchanges and social 
interactions.  As a theoretical perspective, the concord that implicitly underlies relational 
contracting contrasts with the opportunism explicitly presumed in both agency theory and 
transaction cost economics (Borsch 1994).  Relational contracting embraces not only 
unspecifiable terms and conditions in complex and open-ended contracts, but also collective 
interorganizational strategies for eliminating rivalry through tacit coordination.  Pursuing a 
collective strategy typically depends on unanticipated future conditions that cannot be explicitly 
written into formal contractual agreements.  Hence, successful strategies require basic trust, 
mutual understanding, unrestricted learning, and interorganizational knowledge-sharing to 
achieve a high level of joint decision making at both strategic and operational levels.  Doz, Olk 
and Ring (2000) operationalized these processes as “open solicitation” and “seeking domain 
consensus,” where the relational partners continually elaborate on their mutual objectives, 
capabilities, resources, and tasks.  Achieving a well-documented consensus would then serve 
as a foundation on which relationally contracted firms could subsequently announce and 
implement a formal strategic alliance.  A central issue remains how best to manage the balance 
between interdependence and control, with the alternative strategic alliance governance forms 
discussed above serving as particularly important mechanisms for resolving conflicts and 
preserving the partners’ relationship (Harrigan 1988a; Haugland 1999).  Social capital, in the 
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form of interpersonal and interorganizational trust, is indispensable to reducing the costs of 
negotiations between partners.  Moreover, many analysts treat trust as both an alliance 
outcome variable and a predictor of alliance success (Olk and Earley 2000). 
 
Managing Alliance Formation.  Once organizations decide to form a strategic alliance, the 
partners face serious challenges of turning their good intentions into a viable enterprise at all 
levels, from routine activities to strategic policies.  This implementation phase typically requires 
that two autonomous firms pool some human resources and material assets; develop a practical 
governance structure with sufficient power and control; and learn how to cooperate for mutual 
benefit.  The inevitable misunderstandings and conflicts arising in a collaborative undertaking 
demand that partner firms and their employees master new management skills, especially 
coping with complex lateral relationships spanning legally autonomous entities.  When two firms 
simply attempt to work together according to an agreement, the clean authority lines of a 
corporation hierarchy typically are supplanted with disorderly parallel command-and-report 
systems.  The managers delegated by the partners to implement the joint project may be initially 
uncertain about who is really in control and possesses final decision making authority.  Careful 
attention must be paid to selecting staff and leaders for liaison management, “the required 
continual linkages among partners and between partners and the alliance” (Mockler 1999:144).  
Creating a formal separate subsidiary having its own board of directors and internal authority 
hierarchy, with equity stakes legally dividing ownership and control among the partners, may 
help to clarify the venture partners’ ultimate rights and expectations vis-à-vis one another.  But, 
even the most meticulous contractual safeguards provide no guarantees against the 
uncertainties, ambiguities, and disputes that constantly surface during daily operations.  Several 
social control processes, such interorganizational trust, reciprocity, and confidence (Das and 
Teng 1998), loom large as mechanisms for sustaining alliances during their precarious 
implementation phase.   
 
Generating trust among alliance participants is crucial to overcoming competitive rivals’ initial 
suspicions about possible partner opportunism, which may prevent effective implementation of 
their collaborative agreement.  Imbalances in organizational power, indicated by disparities in 
the resources contributed and controlled by each partner organization, can impede trust 
creation due to the partners’ unequal capacities to fulfil their obligations (Goel 1994; Chaudhuri 
1995; Brousseau and Quelin 1996; Lin and Germain 1998).  Initial alliances among previously 
inexperienced partners (“virgin ties”) often begin with formal contractual linkages that expose 
the partners only to small risks.  Because both organizations still have few grounds for trusting 
one another, equity-based contracts predominate as legal protections against potential 
opportunism (so-called “hostage-taking” purportedly limits each firm’s capacity to act in 
disregard of the partner’s interests).  Once both partners gain mutual confidence through 
continual testing, then “informal psychological contracts increasingly compensate or substitute 
for formal contractual safeguards as reliance on trust among parties increases over time” (Ring 
and Van de Ven 1994:105).  Repeated strategic alliances among experienced partners are 
more likely to rely on interorganizational trust than on formal safeguards against potential 
partner opportunism.   
 
Prior Alliances.  Using a 1980-89 panel of 166 corporations operating in three worldwide 
sectors (U.S., Japanese, and European new materials, industrial automation, and automotive 
products firms), Gulati (1995b) conducted event-history analyses on a variety of dyadic alliances 
ranging from licensing agreements to closely intertwined equity joint ventures.  He found strong 
evidence that formal equity-sharing agreements decreased with the existence and frequency of 
prior ties to a partner.  Domestic alliances less often involved equity mechanisms than did 
international agreements, supporting claims that trust relations are more difficult to sustain 
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cross-culturally.  Strategically interdependent firms (i.e., companies operating in complementary 
market niches) formed alliances more often than did firms possessing similar resources and 
capabilities.  Previously allied firms were more likely to engage in subsequent partnerships, 
suggesting that over time, each firm acquired more information and built greater confidence in 
its partner.  However, beyond a certain point, additional alliances reduced the likelihood of 
future ties, perhaps reflecting fears of losing autonomy by becoming overly dependent on a 
partner.  (See also Walker, Kogut and Shan 1997; Gulati and Gargiulo 1999.)  Indirect 
connections within the social network of prior alliances also shaped the alliance formation 
process: previously unconnected firms were more likely to ally if both were tied to a common 
third-party, but their chances of partnering diminished with greater path distances.  Gulati 
(1995b: 644) concluded that “the social network of indirect ties is an effective referral 
mechanism for bringing firms together and that dense co-location in an alliance network 
enhances mutual confidence as firms become aware of the possible negative reputational 
consequences of their own or others’ opportunistic behavior.”  His results reflected a logic of 
clique-like cohesion rather than status-competition among structurally equivalent organizations. 
  
Trust and Reciprocity.  Andrea Larson’s (1992) ethnographic exploration of dyadic alliances 
illuminated the role of trust and reciprocity norms during the alliance implementation phase.  
She conducted in-depth interviews in the mid-1980s with informants from seven partnerships 
created by four small entrepreneurial companies (a telephone distributor, a retail clothing 
company, a computer firm, and a manufacturer of environmental support systems).  Although 
mutual economic gain was a necessary incentive for an alliance to emerge, sustaining the 
relationship required a trial period, lasting between six and 18 months, during which the partners 
incrementally built stable and predictable structures to govern their collaboration.  Key features 
of this critical trial phase were the institutionalization of implicit and explicit rules and 
procedures, and the evolution of clear expectations that became taken-for-granted by managers 
in both companies.  As a relationship solidified over time, organizational actions grew more 
integrated and mutually controlled through intertwined operational, strategic, and social 
mechanisms.   
 
Strategic Alliances Outcomes  
 
Although organizations form strategic alliances for diverse motives, and partners generally 
expect to benefit from their collaboration, analysts encounter difficulties in untangling the impact 
of environmental, economic, organizational, and interorganizational factors on alliance 
outcomes and consequences.  Authors of “how to” guides typically trumpet the alleged positive 
consequences of joint ventures and equity arrangements (e.g., Triantis 1999; Wolf 2000).  
Empirical researchers generally appear more pessimistic about partners’ abilities to overcome 
the inherent tensions between competition and cooperation to achieve lasting results.  For 
example, Das and Teng (1998:493) observed that “the essentially fickle and tentative nature of 
partner cooperation should not be overlooked” because it renders many strategic alliances 
“fundamentally self-defeating, unstable, and transitional in nature” (see also Inkpen and 
Beamish 1997).  Conceptual and measurement problems plague performance and productivity 
assessments, whether using objective outcome indicators (e.g., financial gains, innovations) or 
subjective indicators (e.g., partner satisfaction with the collaboration).  Evaluating international 
alliances is especially complicated, because firms from different countries and cultures generally 
apply divergent success criteria (Si and Bruton 1999; Yan and Zeng 1999).  Despite such 
operational difficulties, researchers have investigated a variety of factors affecting several 
dimensions of strategic alliance consequences.     
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Survival and Termination.  One difficulty in assessing performance outcomes is that most 
interorganizational collaborations are intentionally short-lived affairs, designed to achieve only 
limited purposes.  A fundamental performance question is, how long do strategic alliances 
survive beyond their formal announcement before eventual termination?  A collaborative 
agreement may terminate through complete project dissolution, either before or after achieving 
its formal objectives; by a joint venture’s acquisition by one of its partners; or through an 
organizational merger of the parent firms.  Researchers have investigated several factors that 
may affect the survival rates and end states of various types of alliances.   
 
Most analysts found high levels of strategic alliance instability and dissolution, with failure rates 
approaching 50 percent (Harrigan 1988b; Kogut 1988; Dacin, Hitt and Levitas 1997).  Alliances 
in the technologically volatile telecommunication industry exhibit an “alarming tendency to fall 
apart due to fickle behavior of members” (Curwen 1999:141).  Bleeke and Ernst (1993) used 
unpublished reports and interviews with insiders of top companies in the U.S., Europe and 
Japan to determine that, among 49 cross-border alliances, 51 percent were successful for both 
partners while 33 percent resulted in failure for both.  Success meant that the partners achieved 
their own strategic objectives and recovered their financial capital costs.  An event history 
analysis of 186 joint ventures among U.S. and Japanese electronics firms between 1979-1988 
found a 43 percent dissolution rate, with an average life span of less than five years (Park and 
Ungson 1997). International joint ventures are purportedly more vulnerable to 
misunderstandings arising from incompatible national and corporate cultures, resulting in high 
managerial conflicts and early terminations (see also Lin and Germain 1998; Simonin 1999; 
Steensma and Lyles 2000).  However, contrary to expectations, Park and Ungson found that 
U.S.-Japanese electronics joint ventures lasted longer and were less likely to dissolve than 
domestic alliances between American firms.   
 
Analysts disagree whether project acquisition, or the internalization of a joint venture by one of 
the partners, should be treated as an alliance failure or a successful realization of the acquiring 
organization’s personnel and capital investments.  The widespread assumption that instability is 
equivalent to collaborative failure may be inaccurate.  Data on 272 terminated IJVs revealed 
frequent equity transfers between the parent firms, reflecting the ultimate owner’s strategic 
intentions from the start of the venture (Reuer 1997).  More than 80 percent of the international 
alliances studied by Bleeke and Ernst ended in acquisitions, usually by the stronger partner 
(1995:97).  Among the important factors explaining this outcome were firm size, frequency of 
interorganizational communication, board of directors power, the relative size of partner 
contributions, and inequalities in distributing the benefits produced by the partnership.   
 
A complete merger between organizations represents an extreme outcome of a strategic 
alliance.  Partnerships may serve as a transitional phase (“courtship”) in which potential mates 
explore the feasibility of fusing their identities into a new enterprise.  By enabling two courting 
organizations to observe one another’s business activities from the inside, alliances familiarize 
top managers with both corporate cultures and reveal the potential for performance 
improvements by combining operations (Nanda and Williamson 1995).  However, Hagedoorn 
and Sadowski (1999) argued that transitions from strategic technology alliances to acquisitions 
and mergers rarely occur.  Just 2.6 percent of 6,425 alliances from 1970-1993 could be directly 
linked to such transformations.  The authors concluded that strategic technology partnering is a 
distinct mode of governance which is unconnected to subsequent merger (for other views of this 
sector’s dynamics, see Hennart and Reddy 1997; Jamison 1998).   
 
Achieving Learning Objectives.  Many organizations enter alliances with great anticipation 
about learning from their partners, whether as the primary goal or as a derivative of other 
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objectives, such as creating new products and technologies or penetrating into new markets.  
Organizational learning occurs when a firm acquires, assimilates, and applies new information, 
knowledge, and skills that enhance its long-run performance and competitive advantage.  
Strategic alliances can operate as institutionalized channels for transferring and creating new 
organizational capacities.  Learning may occur either through exploitation as one organization 
acquires another’s know-how, or through common experience as partners learn synergically 
while implementing a collaborative agreement (Tsang 1999).  The first dynamic connotes 
competition, while the latter process implies greater mutuality and interdependence.  Factors 
shaping basic organizational learning capacity include “the nature of the shared business 
activity, the type of knowledge jointly developed, and the firm’s reward system” (Lei, Slocum and 
Pitts 1997:210).   
 
Although substantial organizational enlightenment may occur through vicarious learning and 
imitation of a more sophisticated partner, R&D collaborations typically require mutual 
experiential learning activities to synthesize original knowledge, which then becomes the 
venture owners’ joint intellectual property.  Whether organizational learning involves acquiring 
routine or extraordinary knowledge, transaction cost analysts caution that alliance participants 
risk potential opportunism from their partner’s unrestricted access to proprietary secrets and 
patented processes.  Repeated collaborations enhance mutual learning experiences as 
interorganizational trust emerges to substitute for formal protections against the fear of being 
ripped off.  A study of 212 alliances in six manufacturing and service industries found that higher 
levels of relational capital (social capital based on trust, respect and friendship) and integrative 
conflict resolution mechanisms (ensuring fairness and procedural justice) increased both 
corporate learning and protection of proprietary assets (Kale, Singh and Perlmutter 2000).   
 
Organizational success in achieving alliance learning objectives depends on several dimensions 
of knowledge and organizational structure.  In particular, both organizations’ absorptive 
capacities--their interwoven human resources, finance capital, social capital, and organizational 
belief systems--constrain their effective information processing, acquisition of partner expertise, 
and adoption of innovations.  In a survey with high-tech firms, the most significant determinant 
of knowledge transferability was tacitness, defined as knowledge “which cannot be easily 
communicated and shared, is highly personal and deeply root in action and in an individual’s 
involvement with a specific context” (Simonin 1999:469).  Moreover, the impacts of partner 
cultural distance, asset specificity, and past experience on knowledge ambiguity were 
moderated by alliance duration, firm size, and collaborative experience.  An exploratory study of 
network formation in 53 R&D consortia (Doz, Olk and Ring 2000) found that tacit learning was 
more strongly connected to similar interests of the partners, and was unrelated to solicitation 
and consensus-seeking processes during the alliance formation period.  Thus, the partners’ 
attitudes and needs had stronger influence on their learning capabilities than did their 
interactions prior to entering the alliance.   
 
Case studies of learning in specific industries have also identified factors that aid or thwart 
innovation and knowledge transfer among alliance partners.  Embedded internal constraints on 
knowledge exchange and organizational learning, arising from the firms’ incompatible 
organizational structures and corporate cultures, ultimately doomed collaboration among 
unequals.   
 
Alliance Impacts on Partners.   Apart from the immediate outcomes of formal collaborative 
activities, strategic alliances may also affect the partnering organizations’ performances and 
survival chances.  Some analysts seek to link alliance characteristics to various firm economic 
indicators such as stock prices, profits, productivity, market shares.  A more difficult task is to 
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demonstrate that alliances produce substantial non-financial, or transformational, outcomes 
such as enhanced organizational credibility (Human and Provan 1997).  For example, do firms 
involved in certain types of collaborations gain in perceived legitimacy, trustworthiness, and 
reputation for quality within their organizational fields?  A considerable empirical problem is how 
to detect the consequences of relatively small alliances for their much large parent 
organizations.   
 
One outcome hypothesis attracting recent research attention is that strategic alliances 
contribute to superior production performance by the parents.  Research on 142 Canadian 
biotechnology startup firms from 1991-1996 found that their initial performances were enhanced 
by establishing alliance networks that provided access to “diverse information and capabilities 
with minimum costs of redundancy, conflict, and complexity,” gave more opportunities to learn 
from established rivals, but avoided risky intra-alliance rivalries (Baum, Calabrese and 
Silverman 2000:287).  In particular, the startups’ alliance networks boosted their innovativeness 
as measured by rates of patenting and R&D growth.  A comparative study of alliance networks 
among 138 steel and 130 semiconductor firms from 1990-1994 found that the influence of 
network characteristics on firm performance varied with industry contexts (Rowley, Behrens and 
Krackhardt 2000).   
 
In another analysis of semiconductor firms from 1985-1991, Stuart (2000) investigated the 
impact of alliances on innovation rates and economic growth.  He measured innovation as the 
number of patents granted and growth as annual semiconductor sales.  The crucial factors were 
not the size of each firm’s alliance portfolio (number of alliances formed during the previous five 
years), but the resource profiles of its partners.  Specifically, both innovation and sales rates 
increased substantially if a firm was connected to more technologically innovative and revenue-
rich alliance partners.  These effects were especially potent for younger and smaller firms. An 
important implication of Stuart’s analysis is that firms derive advantage from their partners’ 
corporate social capital, even if their strategic alliance fails to achieve its professed formal 
objectives.  Again we see that defining alliance success and failure is fraught with ambiguities.   
 
Another basic outcome hypothesis is that a strategic alliance increases a firm’s equity value if 
the collaboration enhances the parent organizations’ competitive advantages.  Firms that 
transfer proprietary knowledge and pool specialized resources and employee skills into a joint 
R&D project sometimes achieve technological breakthroughs with widespread product 
applications that yield market windfalls for all partners.  Several investigations uncovered 
positive impacts of alliances on corporate shareholder value.  The average stock price response 
was positive on the day of announcements for 345 nonequity strategic alliances by 460 most 
high-tech firms from 1983-1992 (Chan, Kensinger, Keown and Martin 1997).  Among alliances 
between firms within same industry, a bigger stock price jump occurred for technical than for 
marketing agreements, suggesting “that partnering firms from the same industry can better take 
advantage of technological complementarities” (p. 213).   
 
In contrast to robust research on the financial consequences of alliances for partner 
organizations, studies of noneconomic outcomes are relatively rarer.  Typical subjective 
measures include informant ratings of performance and subjective satisfaction with the alliance 
partner.  For example, Sim and Ali (1998) found higher success ratings with past joint venture 
experience and greater cooperation.  Saxton (1997) found that perceptions of initial and overall 
relationship satisfaction increased with higher partner reputation for management quality; with 
greater shared strategic decision making; and with greater strategic fit or similarities between 
the partners.  However, a prior partnership with another firm was linked only to initial satisfaction 
but not to longer term alliance benefits. Continued partnering reflects inertia or 
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institutionalization “as opposed to a reflection of mutual trust and commitment” (Saxton, 1997: 
455).  Among negative consequences of alliance networks researchers identify the effect of 
social embeddedness on market efficiencies by locking partners into unproductive relations or 
blocking collaboration with other viable firms, and “rigidity in changing order levels and trading 
partners [and] potential lack of market stimulus.”  (Gulati, Nohria & Zaheer 2000, Sako 
(1992:239).   
 
Societal Consequences.  Researchers have paid least attention to the impacts of strategic 
alliances on the larger social systems in which they are embedded.  Economists have sounded 
theoretical alarms about the increased anticompetitive consequences of cooperative endeavors, 
warning that partnerships can hinder efficient production, restrict market access, and reduce 
economic competition (Carlton and Salop 1995).  In particular, multiple recurrent R&D projects 
among members of an alliance network may create opportunities for collusion by firms that 
simultaneously compete across multiple product markets (Vonortas 2000).  Although alliance 
participation by foreign firms in domestic industries may safeguard against anticompetitive 
behavior, domestic firms sometimes set up joint ventures precisely to deter market entry (Zhao 
1999).  An alliance between an incumbent airline with excess capacity and an entrant to share 
expensive facilities at lower costs can appear efficient and competitive, but “may be made to 
discourage the entrant from building its own facility and entering at a larger, more competitive 
scale” (Chen and Ross 2000:328).  By reducing the total capacity that might otherwise be 
constructed (thus keeping consumer prices higher through restricting supply), anticompetitive 
arrangements can reduce societal welfare even when the alliance partners do not directly 
compete.  Negative impacts may be especially flagrant where multinational firms use joint 
ventures with local firms as strategic devices to penetrate developing nations.   
 
Similar qualms concern greater concentration within industries arising from the competitive 
advantages achieved by R&D alliances compared to firms that independently pursue R&D 
innovations.  The superior economic efficiencies accruing to R&D alliance members may 
paradoxically contribute to less-competitive outcomes at the industry level, with consumers 
again paying higher prices.  If alliance networks lead to concentration of R&D funding within an 
industry, rates of innovation may fall in the absence of competitors to spur exertions forward.   
 
Conclusions and Future Directions 
 
Strategic alliances are more than simple instrumental means for achieving collective goals 
directly benefiting the collaborators.  They also constitute each partner firms’ corporate social 
capital, providing potential access to various assets controlled by other strategic alliance 
network members. Alliances provide opportunities for participants to tap into the resources, 
knowledge, and skills of their immediate partners in a portfolio of inter-firm agreements.  
Further, given latent reachability across strong ties and possibilities for activating brokerage 
efforts to interconnect the partners of partners, these complex patterns of social capital 
embedded within an organizational field-net of a strategic alliance offer enormous potential for 
significantly leveraging its member firms’ resource capabilities. Theoretical conjectures and 
empirical investigations of strategic alliances over the past two decades reveal an accelerating 
proliferation of these interorganizational phenomena.  Arm’s-length market exchanges may 
prove less efficient than alternative interfirm arrangements for carrying out many complex co-
production processes, such as R&D on highly uncertain technologies, as well as for overcoming 
legal-political-cultural barriers to cross-national transactions. Current debates over the 
globalization of business systems emphasize how both local and international environments 
foster international joint venture partnerships, but these environments may also inhibit the full 
realization of benefits obtainable through such relationships.  The images of mixed advantages 
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and drawbacks accruing from collaborative enterprises reflect the current ambiguous state of 
knowledge about strategic alliance networks and their multidimensional consequences.   
 
Partner selection comprises the largest and richest body of empirical research.  It seeks to 
explain who collaborates with whom, at what rates, for how long, and deploying what 
governance forms (especially equity or nonequity ownership of joint enterprises).  An important 
subset focuses on IJVs, with their added complexity of diverse cross-national cultures and legal-
governmental systems.  Analysis of alliance formation processes should feature more explicit 
contingency perspectives that explicitly identify how variations in business systems, industries, 
strategic alliance networks (organizational field nets), markets, and organizational attributes 
condition participation opportunities and organizational perceptions of collaborative efficacy.  
We also urge more study of innovative dynamics occurring at the strategic alliance network 
level; that is, not by examining the creation of new products and technologies, but explaining 
how tie-formation processes subsequently feedback to transform the global network structure 
itself.  Some other fundamental questions whose conditional elaboration could be profitably 
pursued include:   
 
Similarity versus complementarity in partner choice:  If strategic alliances are primarily 
about gaining access to useful resources not possessed by an organization, then collaborating 
with complementary strengths and weaknesses presumably yields larger payoffs than affiliating 
with highly similar peers.  But, which organizational attributes hold the keys to a more perfect 
union and under what conditions?  Products, market positions, technologies, human resources, 
managerial styles, or more intangible elements such as reputation and institutional thought 
patterns?  Perhaps curvilinear relationships are more plausible. 
 
Regarding the issue of cultural distance a relevant question is whether particular nations have 
specific cultural codes, equivalent to the trust-based cooperative norms of Japanese society, 
that foster and sustain higher cross-national collaboration rates?  Researchers also recognize a 
strong tendency for partners to repeat their alliances over time, but the conditions favoring 
persistence and desistence aren’t fully understood.  Brokerage processes, involving third-party 
introductions and vetting, are crucial social mechanisms for forging new ties between 
unacquainted organizations.  But, more needs to be learned about the characteristics and 
conditions favoring successful as well as failed match-making.  The complementarity principle 
suggests that brokers will perform better if they serve to connect somewhat disparate, rather 
than highly similar, partners.     
 
Network patterns and processes:  Organizational field nets typically exhibit internally 
differentiated but malleable structures, with some actors occupying more central locations and 
controlling access to information and resources.  Researchers can apply network principles to 
investigate important questions about alliance formation processes across several levels of 
analysis.  At the micro-level of a firm, how do individual organizations’ varied positions within the 
strategic alliance network facilitate or impede the construction of more diverse portfolios?  
Among the several alternative centrality conceptualizations, which measures yield greater 
explanatory accuracy in predicting new and repeat alliances?  At the macro-level of a complete 
field-net, how do changes in various structural dimensions alter alliance formation rates over 
time?  Most intriguing, what cross-level conditional effects occur, involving interactions among 
firm attributes, ego-centric positions, and complete networks on collaborative dynamics?   
 
Fusion or fission:  Not all alliances are intentionally designed to achieve mutually beneficial 
outcomes for all parties.  Some organizations may enter strategic alliances as cautious, lower-
risk pathways for exploring opportunities for subsequent mergers, takeovers, or business-unit 
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divestitures.  Researchers need a deeper understanding of conditions promoting such 
manipulative behavior, with or without partner consent, and how such arrangements differ from 
collaborations intended to preserve partner autonomy.  When are firms more disposed to form 
temporary alliances for controlled risk-assessment prior to taking the plunge into full-fledged 
corporate fusion or fission?   
 
Developmental Dynamics: The period after an alliance announcement, from implementation to 
termination, is less thoroughly investigated.  Analysts routinely stress the importance of trust as 
a crucial form of corporate social capital important to overcoming awkwardness and potential 
conflicts while partners attempt to turn their plans into practices.  Power dynamics also come 
into play as project managers negotiate the practical allocation of authority, property rights, 
management responsibilities, and division of rewards or losses from the undertaking.  We have 
little information about immanent failures during initial attempts to implement a formal 
agreement.  What conditions lead to the abrupt breakdown of negotiations and discourage 
further efforts to relaunch a new partnership?  Organizational researchers have conducted too 
few ethnographic studies to comprehend the full range of patterns and problems encountered 
by real alliance participants.  What institutional, relational, and organizational features of a 
strategic alliance network push projects along increasingly cooperative or hostile trajectories?  
In the absence of hierarchical controls, are agents’ personal attributes or organizations’ 
structural features more important for sustaining corporate trust and implementing quality 
working relations?  What measures of absorptive capacity could enable researchers to test 
many interesting theoretical hypotheses about knowledge transfers between partners and 
learning processes occurring within projects?  Organizational sociology needs more detailed 
explorations of alliance termination dynamics, particularly whether amicable or unpleasant 
conclusions produce lingering impacts for subsequent attempts to collaborate with the same or 
new partners.   
 
Performance Outcomes: An impressive literature has accumulated about the performance 
outcomes of alliances and the parent organizations.  Some empirical studies suggest that most 
collaborations are relatively short-lived, with many failing to achieve their formal objectives of 
R&D innovation, organizational learning, or foreign-market penetration.  Other evidence 
indicates that the parent organizations often derive significant performance benefits, such as 
stock price boosts and sales growth following alliance announcements.  This mixed evidence 
apparently has not dampened the accelerating reliance on strategic alliance, especially among 
global businesses.  Analysts should increasingly disentangle the relative impacts of 
organizational, relational, and environmental contexts on various performance measures.  
Theorists could construct more nuanced specifications of detailed social mechanisms that 
conditionally influence outcomes in strategic alliance networks.  For example, which formal 
governance structures interact with what organizational components to boost learning and 
knowledge transfer?  How does the corporate social capital embedded in interfirm trust relations 
combine with social norms emerging from a collaboration to shape the distribution of outcome 
rewards among the partners?  Finally, because analysts have paid so little attention to the 
unintended consequences of proliferating alliances at the societal and international levels, 
researchers have much to scrutinize.   
 
In conclusion, organizational sociology’s collective understanding of the social organization and 
dynamics of strategic alliance behavior has come far over the past two decades.  But, as this 
section indicates, we still have many more questions than answers.  Fortunately, numerous 
opportunities abound for collaborative theorizing and analysis.   
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